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ABSTRACT 
Although  signiﬁcant  scholarly  attention  has  been  devoted  to  the 
study  of  mosque  conﬂicts  in  Europe,  up  until  now  most  of  it  has 
focussed  on  Western  European  countries.  This  has  left  a  signiﬁcant 
gap  to  be  ﬁlled  in  the  study  of  mosque  tensions  in  Central  and 
Eastern Europe, where scholarship is scant yet  where tensions  over 
constructions  of  mosques  are  not  less  intensive  than  in  the  West. 
Drawing  on  two  recent  case  studies  of  mosque  constructions  in 
Poland,  we  argue  that  a  signiﬁcant  shift  has  taken  place  in  the 
ways    that    mosques    are    perceived,    unveiling    unprecedented 
opposition    towards    their    construction.    From    being    largely 
unproblematic   before   the   Second   World   War   and   during   the 
Communist era, mosques have become subjects of ﬁerce public 
debate. We draw parallels to how anti-mosque arguments raised in 
Poland  ﬁt  into  a  larger  European  meta-narrative  on  mosques  and 
Muslims,  yet  our  aim  is  to  situate  the  paper  historically  to  argue 
that    Polish    mosque    conﬂicts    must    be    contextualised    within 
Poland’s  unique  historical  encounter  with  Islam  in  order  to  more 
accurately make sense of its creeping Islamophobia. 
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Introduction 
Islam in Europe has gained an increasingly public proﬁle over the last decades. This 
has been linked not only to the demographic growth of European Muslim 
communities and the multifaceted processes of their adaptation to changing social, 
economic and political conditions, but also to external factors such as for example 
the Iranian Revolution, 9/ 11, and more recently the ‘War on Terror’. The terrorist 
attacks carried out in Europe both by so-called Islamists as well as Islamophobes – 
most notably in Spain in 2004, Britain in 2005, Norway in 2011 and Paris in 2015 – 
have also contributed to the politicisation of Islam on the continent. 
Correspondingly, there has been a growing body of scholarship focusing on 
Muslims in Europe and their relations with non-Muslims, including tensions and 
conﬂicts between them (Bektovic 2012; Dassetto and Rallet 2010). Mosque 
building projects are an important site at which some of these conﬂicts emerge, and 
increased scholarly attention has been given to this issue in the last decade (Kong 
2010). 
The vast body of literature devoted to this subject has, however, almost solely 
centred on Western European geographies (Gale and Naylor 2002; Gilliat-Ray and 
Birt 2010; Schmitt 2012) not least in this journal’s special issue on mosque conﬂicts in 
Europe (Cesari 2005). With a few exceptions (Chudzikova and Naglova 2011; 
Melicharek 2009; Nalborczyk 2011) there has been little engagement with the topic 
in the region of Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter CEE). In Allievi’s (2010) 
extensive publication, ‘Mosques in Europe’, Europe’s central region is again 
 overlooked. 
This paper aims to start ﬁlling the gap that we identify in existing research by 
exploring conﬂicts around mosque construction projects in Poland. We 
contextualise mosque conﬂicts through an historical lens, one that is sensitive to the 
signiﬁcant Islamic history of Poland as well as the country’s recent Communist 
past. In so doing, we propose to enlarge the conceptual as well as empirical 
lenses through which mosque conﬂicts in CEE are assessed. By situating this 
paper in theoretical frameworks that astutely critique the epistemic dominance of 
Western narratives, we want to write against what we observe to be a tradition of 
subordination of those European narratives that fall outside of dominant Western 
knowledges. As such, events occurring in the CEE region are either entirely ignored, 
or understood as merely reproducing earlier developments in Western Europe. 
While appreciating that pan-European mosque conﬂicts  inﬂuence the  Polish  
setting and, what is more, that Islamophobic attitudes circulate between national 
contexts, not least with increased migration ﬂows (see Gawlewicz and Narkowicz 
2015), we hope to give justice to the local context and more accurately assess an 
unprecedented growth of public expressions of Islamophobia in Poland. 
This paper is inspired by post-dependence theory that draws from post-colonial 
theoretical insights and applies these to post-communist geographies. Post-colonial 
theory has enabled for an alternative way of thinking around modernity, giving 
space for critical engagement with Otherness. It has primarily focused the analytical 
lens on power relationships between (ex) colonies and Western imperial states 
(Tlostanova 2012). The geographical space of the ‘second world’ or as Tlostanova 
calls it ‘a stray outgrowth of western modernity’ has not been readily included in 
post-colonial theory. This argues Madina Tlostanova has left a ‘theoretical void’ 
for a critical study of the effects of Communism. The changes occurring post-1989 
carried with them an expectation that post-communist states would ‘catch up’ with 
their Western neighbours in what was conceptualised as a linear process of 
progress to reach Western modernity (Mayblin, Piekut, and Valentine 2014). 
Following Maria Todorova’s (1997) early application of Saidian Colonialism to the 
Balkans, post-colonial theoretical insights found their way into  scholarship that 
aimed to critically make sense of the post-communist context (see Domański 
2004; Janion 2006). Although not without critique of being inapplicable to CEE 
(Snochowska-Gonzales 2012), post-colonial insights have more recently been 
adapted to ﬁt the very speciﬁc post-communist context with the emergence of 
post-dependence theory (Tlostanova 2012). Tlostanova proposes post-
dependence theory as a way to analyse knowledge that grows out of local histories 
(Tlostanova 2012). We apply this perspective to make sense of the Polish mosque 
conﬂicts and the growth of anti-Muslim prejudice. We stress that not only 
should scholarship on mosque conﬂicts in Europe include the often neglected 
outsiders of Western modernity – the post-communist geographies – but also that 
these processes need to be understood within local histories that are inﬂuenced by 
meta-narratives of modernity. Understanding Poland’s position as outside of the 
ideological construct of the West is crucial for an understanding of contemporary 
politics of Othering in the country. Post-dependence theory thus allows for more 
nuanced readings of the emerging Islamophobic trends in Poland because it allows 
the ‘not quite European’ perspective to be heard on its own terms (Tlostanova 2012, 
133). It also allows us to tell the story of mosque conﬂicts and emerging 
Islamophobia in a country like Poland without the need to ﬁt into pre-existing 
 moulds shaped by Western European experiences of mosque politics. While the 
religious genealogy of Islam in the West is multifaceted and heterogeneous, there are 
nevertheless stark historical differences between Western Europe and CEE that 
impact on the way that Islam, and Islamophobia, manifests itself today. 
This paper is divided into three parts. Our starting point is historical and aims to 
show how Muslims in Poland have gone from being a largely accepted community to 
becoming a suspicious one, opposed by large segments of the Polish society. An 
understanding of the recent escalations of Islamophobic sentiments in Poland 
requires a rooting of the mosque conﬂicts both in Poland’s largely amicable and 
longstanding historical relationship with Islam, and Poland’s recent history of 
Communism and then post-Communism. We show how the growth of the Muslim 
community in the last decades changed its character and proﬁle. Here, we focus also 
on the intricate inter-group tensions in the diverse Muslim community and their role 
in the mosque conﬂicts. Secondly, we map the contemporary conﬂicts over 
mosques by looking at two recent cases of mosque constructions in Warsaw. We 
attempt to unravel the vast array of arguments that used by various mosque 
opponents. Finally, we situate the Warsaw case studies within a broader discus- 
sion on growing Islamophobia in Poland. 
This paper is based on two main sets of qualitative data. The ﬁrst, conducted by the 
ﬁrst author, was part of a year-long doctoral ﬁeldwork project in Warsaw, mapping 
mosque conﬂicts in Poland. It involved 6 focus groups (N = 26) and 11 individual and 
paired interviews (N = 13) with local residents, city authorities, anti-mosque activists 
and Muslims as well as participant observations, media and documentary analysis. 
The second set of data was gathered by the second author for a research project 
focusing on Muslim communities in Poland, carried out between 2011 and 2013. 
This consisted of 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of different Muslim 
groups, participant observation and a Muslim focus group (N = 10). Additionally, 
ﬁndings are provided from an ongoing project by the second author (2014–2016) 
on religious dimensions of Islamophobia in Poland. This involves systematic 
content analysis of Catholic media in Poland as well as interviews with Muslim and 
anti-Muslim groups in the   country. 
 
 
From a homogenous ‘us’ to a diverse ‘them’ 
Like in many other parts of Europe the process of Muslim Othering has been closely 
linked to wider socio-political transformations and national as well as pan-
European identity construction processes (Delanty 1995). In the case of Poland, it 
has in the last decades also been associated with the growing diversity of the 
Muslim community and the inter-group tensions that accompanied this 
diversiﬁcation. Muslims have been portrayed in the Polish historiography in 
ambiguous ways. While in certain periods and by some groups viewed as heroes 
and guardians of Polish sovereignty and framed within an inclusive category of ‘us’, 
at other times and by other groups Muslims were framed as ‘Others’ and perceived 
as invaders, deadly enemies and aliens (Borawski and Dubiński 1986). Overall, 
the Tatars were welcomed in Poland and constituted part of country’s history of 
religious diversity that spanned across several centuries (Dziekan 2011). 
Although the very ﬁrst account of Polish tribes and proto-state structures on the 
Polish historical territories comes from tenth-century Arabic sources (Hermes 
 2012), until the end of the thirteenth-century Poles had only sporadic contact with 
Muslims. Permanent Muslim settlements did not appear within the Polish–
Lithuanian territories until the end of the fourteenth century. Initially these 
settlements were made up of Tatar prisoners of war and refugees in the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania, at that time a shared monarchy with Poland. The ﬁrst 
presence of a mosque in the Polish–Lithuanian state was noted in the sixteenth 
century (Chazbijewicz, Bohdanowicz, and Tyszkiewicz 1997). 
Polish openness to Muslim and other faith groups was evidenced in the early laws 
on religious freedom. It was mobilised by the liberal rule of the Jagiełło dynasty and 
materialised in the 1573 Warsaw Confederation, a pioneering formalisation of 
religious tolerance law in Europe that secured religious freedoms for minority 
faith communities. At that time, Poland was ethnically and religiously diverse with 
signiﬁcant groups of Tatars, Jews, Armenians, Ukrainians and Germans living side 
by side with Poles and Lithuanians. The Tatars in the united Poland and Lithuania 
lost their language by the end of the sixteenth century and incorporated some 
Polish–Lithuanian traditions but maintained their religion and customs. A new wave 
of Tatar settlers arrived in present-day northeast Poland at the end of the seventeenth 
century and continue to live there to this day (Czarniejewska, Kosowicz, and Marek 
2009). As the community grew, comprising up to 25,000 people (Sobczak 1984), 
mosques were built without opposition as there were no formal restraints to the 
construction of Muslim places of worship (Konopacki 2010, 105). Muslims played a 
key role in the Polish–Lithuanian defence system and most signiﬁcantly were part of 
the Polish King Sobieski’s army during the Battle of Vienna in 1683. Thus, one of 
the important battles with the Ottoman Empire was won in part thanks to the 
support of Muslim soldiers in the Polish army – a fact that is not consistent with 
the vision of the Second Siege of Vienna as a victory of Christians against 
Muslims, frequently evoked by Polish nationalists and anti-Muslim groups. In 
contrast to the contemporary framing of Muslim immigrants as ‘Others’, Tatars 
have predominantly historically been framed as ‘us’. 
The societal acceptance of Muslims also translated to an unchallenged visibility 
of Muslim communities. Before Poland disappeared from the maps of Europe at 
the end of the eighteenth century, there were 23 mosques and 5 prayer houses within 
the country’s borders (Kryczyński 1938). In the Poland that re-emerged on the maps 
of Europe after the First World War there were 19 Muslim communities, each with 
their mosques and cemeteries (Kryczyński 1938). After the Second World War and 
Poland’s westward shift on the map of Europe, only about 10% of the traditional 
Tatar settlements remained within the new Polish borders. The post-war 
migrations further dispersed the Tatar community across the country (Nalborczyk 
and Gródź 2010). In contrast to Poland’s ethno-religious composition prior to 
World War II, when over 30% of the population belonged to minorities of 
Ukrainian, Jewish, Byelorussian and German descent, post-war Poland was 
largely ethnically homogenous. With almost 90% of its citizens declaring 
adherence to the Roman Catholic Church, Poland also became one of the most 
religiously homogenous countries in Europe (GUS 2014). In the context of these new 
socio-cultural realities, Islam started to experience a slow revival as a result of the 
processes of migration. From the 1970s Muslims immigrated to Poland initially for 
educational purposes (especially from befriended socialist Arab countries), and 
later for economic and political reasons (e.g. refugees from Chechnya) (Pędziwiatr 
2011). 
 The collapse of Communism changed the regional patterns of migration. Apart   
from dynamic emigration processes, Poland became increasingly attractive to 
immigrants (among them Muslim professionals and refugees). With the arrival of 
these new groups of Muslims the Tatars have gradually lost their status as the 
representatives of the Polish Muslim community, and today the Tatars make up 
only a small minority (up to 5000) within a wider (around 35,000) Muslim 
community in Poland. The remaining majority is a very diverse group that is 
comprised of former and current students, professionals, members of the 
diplomatic corps, economic migrants, refugees (up until now predominantly 
Chechens) and, importantly, a growing number of Poles who have converted to 
Islam. The community is heterogeneous not only in ethnic but also religious 
terms. 
The growing diversity within the Muslim community in Poland has also led to 
increasing tensions between the various groups of believers. These tensions have 
emerged not only as a result of theological differences between the groups, but also 
as a consequence of ethno-cultural diversity, differences in religious practice and 
struggle for authority (Warmińska 1999; Pędziwiatr 2011). The two major 
organisations that claim to represent Muslims in Poland are Muzułmański Związek 
Religijny or MZR [Muslim Religious Union] and Liga Muzułmańska or LM 
[Muslim League] (Pędziwiatr 2011). The MZR, founded by a group of Tatars in 
1925, has acted as the main representative body of the Polish Muslims. The Mufti 
of Poland is the ofﬁcial head of the MZR and is perceived by the state as the 
primary representative of Muslims in Poland. The LM was set up much later – in 
2001 – by Muslims of more recent immigrant origin and gained ofﬁcial state 
recognition as a religious community in 2004. 
Some of the intricate inter-community tensions became particularly visible 
during the conﬂicts analysed in this paper when Islam became the subject of intense 
public scrutiny following the announcement of mosque construction projects in the 
Polish capital. In contrast to mosque conﬂicts in the West, an important part of 
the contestation of the constructions came from within the leadership of the 
Polish Tatar community. The Tatars used this opportunity to stress their 
indigenousness, Europeanness and sameness with other Poles while at the same 
time implicitly or explicitly pointing to the alienness and difference of the more 
recent Muslim migrants engaged in the construction of the mosques. The 
Ochota mosque construction also sparked wider civilisational arguments 
separating the Tatars from the ‘new’ Muslims. A former Tatar Imam of the 
Gdańsk mosque argued, for example, that the hijab is a relic from the Middle 
Ages and should not be adopted by modern European Muslims. Positioning 
himself as dichotomously opposed to the ‘non-European’ Muslims, and 
speaking against Polish acceptance of Muslim refugees on the Polish online 
portal NaTemat, he emphasised a division in the Polish Muslim community 
between Tatars (considered good, European and civilised Muslims) and the 
‘Other’ Muslims (largely including Arabs, Polish converts and other non-Tatars). 
Such attempts by the Tatars, marked by an ambition towards closeness with 
Western modernity and maintenance of monopoly of religious authority, feed into 
Islamophobic narratives. As we point out towards the end of this paper, the 
repercussions of heightened anti-Muslim sentiments affect all Muslims in Poland, 
including the Tatars, who are not themselves immune to this Othering, despite 
 having contributed to the creation of such a narrative. 
 
From unproblematic to increasingly contentious mosques 
The history of mosques in Poland reﬂects the aforementioned transformations 
of the Muslim community in the country. The historic sources are generally silent 
about any protests against the building of Muslim religious spaces in the period of 
shared monarchy and Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth (Kryczyński 1938). The 
only exception seems to be an incident in Trakai in 1609 when a crowd ravaged a 
local mosque in the religious fervour of the counter-reformation (Sobczak 1984). 
After Poland regained its independence in 1918, the state – along with the Tatar 
community – renovated the majority of the Muslim places of worship that were left 
in what became the new Polish territory. No new mosques were built in the inter-
war period in spite of plans for such constructions in Vilnius and Warsaw. One of 
the key reasons for this was a lack of resources (Nalborczyk 2011). Today, out of the 
19 pre-war Muslim communities within what were then the borders of Poland only 
two small Polish Tatar villages, Kruszyniany and Bohoniki, situated in the eastern 
border with Belarus, continue the Tatar religious and cultural heritage in Poland. 
Each village is home to an historic wooden mosque, still in use. The wooden 
mosques have more in common with the local churches than mosques found across 
the Muslim world, because they were both conceptually inﬂuenced and physically 
built by the same carpenters that constructed Catholic and Orthodox churches at the 
time (Nalborczyk 2011). In addition to the mosques in Kruszyniany and Bohoniki, a 
purpose-built mosque was also constructed in the northern city of Gdańsk 
between 1984 and 1989. It was not local opposition to the mosque that delayed its 
construction but rather the limited availability of building material and funding in 
the failing Communist economy. In fact, as Nalborczyk (2011) writes, the 
Tatars were helped by non-Muslim neighbours and collaborated with the local 
church to build the mosque. 
Despite being home to approximately 10,000 Muslims, Warsaw did not have a 
single purpose-built mosque prior to 2015. In 1993 a residential home in the Polish 
capital was converted into a prayer space and functioned as the main mosque in the 
capital until 2015, when Warsaw’s ﬁrst purpose-built mosque opened three 
years later than planned. While the erections of the wooden mosques in Bohoniki 
and Kruszyniany and the modern one in Gdańsk were by and large unproblematic, 
recent mosque constructions in Poland have been vehemently opposed. 
In many European cities where Muslim minorities are signiﬁcantly larger in 
size, mosques are often located in areas where these minorities themselves reside 
(Naylor and Ryan 2002). In the case of the two mosque construction plans in 
Warsaw, due to the vastly different Muslim landscape in the city, the Ochota and 
Włochy mosque sites are located in non-Muslim majority residential areas. The two 
districts where mosque constructions were planned in 2010 and 2012 are located 
only a few kilometres apart and neighbour each other. While geographically close, 
the mosque neighbourhoods are very different. The Ochota mosque site is located far 
from the residential centre of the neighbourhood, close to a shopping complex, a 
main road and a roundabout. In contrast to the Ochota mosque’s bustling location, 
the Włochy mosque site is in an old residential neighbourhood, called ‘Stare 
Włochy’. The area is much quieter and poorer than Ochota, with local residents 
taking great pride in its unique Garden City inspired architectural style. 
 Differences in the make-up of the two neighbourhoods, along with the scale of their 
gentriﬁcation and transformations since the collapse of Communism, were also 
apparent in the way in which the two mosque constructions were opposed. While in 
Ochota – considered one of the most attractive parts of the city, ethnically 
diversifying and visibly gentrifying over the past decades – the construction of the 
mosque did not mobilise large groups of local protestors, it did so in the district of 
Włochy. As will be shown below, the fact that Włochy has been one of the poorest 
parts of the city and particularly negatively affected by the post-Communist 
economic transformations – for example by relocation to it of families with 
social problems from other parts of the capital (Kuć-Czajkowska 2008) – had clear 
implication for the case in question. The act of excluding a mosque from the Włochy 
neighbourhood has to therefore be understood through the prism of Włochy’s 
marginalised position in the wider context of Warsaw. 
The transition towards democracy generated new insecurities which in turn 
contributed to a scapegoat effect, as Kapralski (2008) has illustrated with the example 
of the Roma population. In a renewed search for easy targets to blame, racist 
stereotypes targeting minority groups ﬂourished in a post-Communist context where 
the relatively weak state structures bend easily to nationalist public sentiments. At the 
same time some old traditional ‘folk devils’ have been losing attractiveness while new 
ones, especially Muslims, are coming to the fore (see Pędziwiatr 2010). 
 
 
Warsaw’s ﬁrst mosque conﬂict: Ochota case study 
In 2010 the Muslim League publicly announced plans for the ﬁrst purpose-built 
mosque in the Polish capital, fuelling an unprecedented national debate on Islam. 
Shortly after the news of the mosque construction burst into the public debate, an 
anti-mosque demonstration was organised. A group called Europa Przyszłości 
[Europe of the Future] emerged as the main orchestrators of the opposition to the 
new mosque. The group is headed by three men who articulated their opposition 
in eloquent terms, proclaiming ‘European values’ of democracy, secularism, 
freedom of expression and, importantly, women’s rights: 
We critique Islam from the position of secularism, from the position of women’s 
movements, gay movements, human rights, let’s call it rational humanism,that is our 
ideal. 
(Male, 30+. Member of Europe of the Future) 
The group argued that these liberal values were core to the Europe they identiﬁed 
with and contradictory to the values of the Muslim League and Muslims at large. 
Ahead of the anti-mosque protest in March 2010, Europe of the Future 
plastered Warsaw city centre with posters of a woman in a black niqab, standing 
next minarets that resembled missiles. The posters were almost identical to Swiss 
anti-minaret posters (yet with a Polish ﬂag and a slogan in Polish that read 
‘Stop the radical mosque in Warsaw’), again conﬁrming a clear ambition for 
the Polish anti-mosque group to be read as in line with a Western European 
mobilisation. The image of the veiled woman on the poster served a double 
purpose; on the one hand symbolising a threat in the form of a foreign terrorist 
body (see Puar 2007), and on the other hand reﬂecting the organisers’ neo-
 colonial ambitions to save Muslim women who they expressed concern for, with 
little acknowledgement of the violence and superiority contained in such narra- 
tives (Abu-Lughod 2002; Spivak 1988). Employment of ‘gender exceptionalism’ 
(Puar 2007) has become a common form of Islamophobic expression in some 
Western countries, perhaps most prominently discussed in the case of the 
Netherlands (Bracke 2012; Butler 2008). While the poster was only temporally 
glued to the walls of Warsaw’s cityscape, liberal arguments borrowed from anti-
mosque protests in other countries were adopted by anti-Muslim opposition in 
Poland. As a local councillor observed, opposition to the mosque was often 
expressed within the context of a concern for ‘the treatment of women by 
Muslims’ (interview with councillor, Ochota neighbourhood). This was echoed by 
many of the interviewees, thus dehumanising Muslims and further creating a 
civilizational gap between Muslims who en bloc treat women badly and ‘us’, who 
do not: 
The [Muslim] women do not get anything. I think they are treated worse than animals. 
(Female, 20+, local resident, Ochota neighbourhood) 
It is difﬁcult to think that we might see a mosque built here next door, with these people 
that treat women badly. 
(Male, 20+, local resident, Ochota neighbourhood) 
We argue that such employment of feminist discourses here is not consistent 
with the current Polish context nor the genealogy of its gender politics that 
differs vastly from many Western European contexts, where the formation of 
gender politics has often been intimately entangled within a colonial nation-state 
framework and then with the post-1989 multicultural debate (see Bracke 2012). In 
CEE, throughout times of war and struggle, ideal womanhood was intimately linked 
with sacriﬁce and martyrdom, an ideal represented in the Virgin Mary (Janion 
2006). This mechanism is further complicated by the ambivalent position of Polish 
gender politics in the ﬁrst place. The enforced gender equality of the Communist 
regime – with childcare provision, legal abortion and the increase of women’s 
education and employment – was hailed and then lamented by Western feminist 
circles after the fall of Communism (Siklova 1993). Consequently, with 
assistance from post-dependence and post-colonial thinking, we assess calls among 
our participants for the liberation of Muslim women in Poland as symptomatic 
of a Polish ambition for closeness to Western Europe that it never truly gained.  In 
the words of Stuart Hall (1992, 276), ‘Eastern Europe doesn’t (doesn’t yet? 
never did?) belong properly to “the West”’ yet the ‘desire to become the West’ 
takes precedence (see Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006). 
On the day of the mosque protests in the Ochota neighbourhood, around 150 
people gathered at the mosque construction site, in what was a curious spectacle 
of unlikely allies. From secular liberals to Polish right-wing nationalists, various 
banners danced in front of the then partially built mosque, bearing slogans such 
as ‘Stop Islamisation of Europe’, ‘Sharia contradictory to democracy’ and ‘Let’s 
not repeat the mistakes of Europe’ (Narkowicz 2014). The liberal anti-Muslim 
group who coordinated the protests hoped to expand their base of alliances by 
pointing to the historic legacy of the mosque construction plot and the 
deceptiveness of the Muslim League (Euroislam Facebook Page, 22 February 
2014). According to the local councillor from the Ochota neighbour- hood 
 mentioned above, the site was the former battleground of Polish soldiers ﬁghting 
against the Russians in the November uprising of 1831. The proximity of the 
Ochota mosque site to a place where Polish soldiers were allegedly buried was for 
him ‘identical’ to the conﬂict around the ‘Ground Zero’ mosque in New York, 
leading him to conclude that the Polish Muslims had a hidden agenda (interview 
with councillor). Europe of the Future raised accusations about the suspect 
nature of the Muslim group behind the mosque construction, arguing that it had 
links with the Muslim Brotherhood (interview with representative). The group also 
argued that the local councillors were misinformed about the construction in their 
area because ‘the plan was only to build a cultural centre in the neighbourhood 
– without a mosque’ (Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 March 2010). According to ofﬁcial 
protocol from a 2010 committee meeting dedicated to construction of the Ochota 
mosque, the authorities gave approval for the construction of a Centre for Muslim 
culture with a prayer space. The description for the construction was reminiscent of 
a similar project in the Italian city of Lodi where the project was described as a 
‘centre for Islamic culture’ with a ‘special space to be used as a prayer room’ and not 
a ‘mosque’ (Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005, 1087). This ostensibly 
minor difference in description of the Warsaw construction was signiﬁcant in 
stoking the confusion and resentment felt among the Warsaw locals regarding 
whether the construction was a mosque or a cultural centre with a prayer space: 
If I wanted to build a church with a bell tower I would not write in my project proposal 
that I would build a little house with a little bell, would I? It says a Centre of Islamic 
culture with a prayer space – there is nothing here that says it will be a mosque! 
(Local councillor, Ochota neighbourhood) 
For some Muslims the wording was not as signiﬁcant. While acknowledging the 
confusion around the deﬁnition of the construction, the Muslims interviewed did 
not regard this as unusual. To them, what mattered most was to have a space to pray. 
The current mosque in Warsaw, a converted family house, was physically incapable 
of accommodating the congregation and a larger space was required. To them, the 
narratives of deception fuelled strongly by Europe of the Future were exaggerated. A 
focus group of Muslim women challenged the secular public-private divide 
propounded by the protestors, proposing the use of a more ﬂexible deﬁnition of what 
constitutes a mosque which reﬂects that of Islamic tradition (Nasser 2005) and is 
also a more familiar narrative in Poland, where religion is an important part of the 
public  sphere: 
Marta: A group of people who tried to force through provocation [were] saying that 
there was an agreement for a Muslim Cultural Centre and not a   mosque. 
Dagmara: There will obviously be prayers there and teaching, whether it is called an 
apartment, a centre of dialogue or a mosque. 
Ayesha: For us it doesn’t matter! 
(Muslim women, focus group) 
The Ochota mosque protests marked a conﬂict not seen before in the Polish public 
sphere. So when a new mosque project was proposed by an entirely different 
Muslim group a couple years later, a protest engaging the whole local 
neighbourhood erupted. With the involvement of the locals, a shift from liberal 
concerns of women’s rights and democracy to arguments rooted much more in a 
Catholic opposition to a foreign religious threat, sufﬁced. 
  
Warsaw’s second mosque conﬂict: Włochy case study 
The Ochota protests were still echoing when in 2012 a new mosque conﬂict 
surfaced only seven kilometres from the Ochota site.  This  time  mosque  
construction  plans were put forward by the Ahmadiyya community, a different 
Muslim group that has little in common with the Muslim League that was 
behind the Ochota mosque. The Ahmadiyyas – a revivalist movement within 
Islam that is by many Muslims not even considered as part of Islam – started their 
missionary work in Poland before the Second World War and currently has a few 
dozen followers in the country (Stawiński 1994). The Ahmadiyya community was 
not new to Włochy at the time of their application for mosque planning 
permission. Indeed, they had for several years owned a small piece of land in 
the area with a house on it, prior to the emergence of the idea of expanding their 
current ofﬁces and prayer space to build a mosque.  Their plan was to erect a 
mosque that would be only two meters higher than their existing building and 
which would house a bookshop alongside prayer facilities (interview with the 
Ahmadi chief architect). 
Resistance to the Ahmadiyya mosque in Włochy differed to that in 
neighbouring Ochota. Firstly, and surprisingly, the main opponents of the 
Ochota mosque – the liberal Europa Przyszłości – did not engage in the 
opposition to Włochy mosque. A statement on their website declared that they 
would not be protesting against the Ahmadiyya mosque because, they argued, the 
Ahmadiyya group was peaceful and not politicised like the other Muslim groups in 
Poland (Euroislam.pl, 11 January 2011). The way that Europa Przyszłości 
distinguished some Muslims from others reﬂected dichotomous binaries established 
between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ Others (Valentine 2010) or between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ Muslims (Mamdani 2004). Despite the fact that the group was supportive 
of the Ahmadiyya construction project, there was still signiﬁcant opposition to the 
mosque initiated by the local councillors which attracted considerable local support. 
To locals, the Ahmadiyyas were no different to other Muslims and irritation was 
caused due to the proximity of the two mosques that for them was a sign of the 
Islamisation of space. The opposition here was driven by locals and reﬂected 
local and national sentiments to a larger extent than in Ochota. The arguments 
mainly focussed on spatial concerns and, albeit to a lesser extent, unveiled 
religiously based opposition. 
A couple of the local councillors from the conservative PIS [Law and Justice] 
party initiated a petition signed by 500 local residents which represented almost 
the entire neighbourhood. Their arguments focussed on spatial aspects, 
interwoven with cultural and security issues: 
The planned mosque, due to its size, would not ﬁt well into the low-built residential 
neighbourhood … lack of parking spaces and many vehicles on the street would cause it 
to lose its character as a leisure space with old trees … the mosque construction 
may lower house prices … We also point to the fact that Islam, irrespective of the 
religious differences between us, is culturally distinct and different, which may lead 
to unwanted and hitherto unknown social problems in the locality (Włochy protest 
letter, 2011). Two of the signatories were a mother and daughter who had been living in 
Włochy for many years. During an interview with them, they insisted that their 
opposition was necessary in order to maintain the character of the neighbourhood. 
 To them, the mosque was yet another imposition on the already fast transforming 
area: 
The urban planning here is very speciﬁc. The neighbourhood is called Residence 
Włochy, so just the word residence speaks for itself, right? 
(Females 30+ and 60+, local residents, Włochy neighbourhood) 
The neighbourhood as imagined by the locals held on to its unique character with no more 
than a few broken bricks. Our ﬁeldwork in the area revealed, however, that a huge 
construction site for a new apartment complex had been erected less than 500 metres from 
where the mosque plot was situated. The apartments were to be several stories high, with a 
tall clock tower in the centre. While the clock tower and the minaret were not considered 
equally out of place, the recent developments in Włochy were not necessarily welcome 
interventions either: 
We got the airport, we got the animal shelter and the trucks passing through … 
everything is brought on the Włochy neighbourhood! 
(Females 30+ and 60+, local residents, Włochy neighbourhood) 
The Włochy opposition, with its focus on the NIMBYesque sentiments of the 
erosion of the character of the locality and its greenery, reﬂected familiar arguments 
against mosque constructions across Europe (Allievi 2010) and beyond (Dunn 2001). 
As such, the issues of spatial planning dominating the vigorous opposition in 
Włochy acted partly as subtext to deeper neighbourhood tensions and were a way to 
restore something that was long gone amidst new and unwanted developments. The 
concerns of the local residents were imbued with nostalgia, attachment, and a need to 
block what was viewed as negative developments by the city authorities (Kuć-
Czajkowska 2008) – making Włochy into a ‘social dumping ground’. Entangled in 
these arguments, moreover, was a religiously rooted opposition – elaborated on 
below – which drew clear inspirations from the idea of Poland as a bulwark of 
Christianity and the force capable of re-Christianising Europe: 
We are not against them for who they are! But let’s not exaggerate because, as I say, soon 
… if you let them once, second time and third time and then a tenth time then there will 
be more mosques because a city won’t ﬁnd the basis to reject them and there will be 
more of them than of our Catholic churches! 
(Females, 30+ and 60+, local residents, Włochy neighbourhood) 
Plans for the Ahmadiyya mosque in Włochy were eventually rejected by the local 
council in the spring of 2013. An extract of the letter motivating the decision to 
reject the mosque construction project read: 
The local residents in Włochy are simply concerned about maintaining the calm 
and the character of the area. The construction of a culturally foreign object is a reason 
for concern regarding the loss of value of the estates in Włochy. 
(Rejection Letter. Włochy council, April 2013) 
Arguments about spatial planning and parking spaces functioned on the one 
hand as general expression of the resistance to change in the neighbourhood and on 
the other hand, as subtext to deeper resentment towards ‘culturally foreign’ and 
religiously Other Muslims, evidenced in the rejection letter above. 
 
 
 The aftermath of mosque conﬂicts 
After years of conﬂict around mosque construction in the capital, only one of the 
two planned constructions went ahead and eventually opened its doors shortly    
before Ramadan in 2015. The construction of Warsaw’s ﬁrst purpose-built 
mosque, located in Ochota neighbourhood, marks a signiﬁcant turning point in 
the long history of Polish Islam. The mosque, which also serves as a cultural 
centre, brings recognition to the Muslim community as was evidenced by the ‘Noc 
Świątyń’ [Night of the Temples] in September 2015, when the newly constructed 
mosque saw more than 1000 non-Muslim visitors (Życie Warszawy, September 15, 
2015). Yet since the beginning of its construction, the Ochota mosque has also been 
a target of hostilities.  During construction, it  was shot at by a person using a 
pneumatic ﬁring weapon; not long after its ofﬁcial opening in 2015, a woman 
threw a pig’s head inside the building (Interview with the mosque’s imam). 
What started as protests against one mosque construction quickly transformed 
into an unprecedented surge in attacks on mosques across Poland in the cities of 
Gdańsk, Poznań and Białystok. Yet perhaps the most devastating – not in scale but in 
symbolism – was the 2014 attack on the seventeenth-century Tatar mosque in 
Kruszyniany. A pig was drawn on the outside wall of the green wooden mosque 
and abusive grafﬁti was sprayed on the graves of the adjacent Muslim cemetery. 
The Tatars, having lived in Poland for several hundred years without experiencing 
hostility, were deeply affected by this unprecedented rise in Islamophobic attacks. 
This incident showed that, in the context of an unprecedented rise in 
Islamophobia, all Muslims are targeted through attacks on their places of worship, 
whether they have lived in Poland for centuries or just a few years. As such, the 
inter-group conﬂicts between Muslims that were discussed earlier can potentially 
con- tribute to – rather than challenge – anti-Muslim prejudice targeted towards all 
communities. 
The transition of the ways that mosques are perceived in Poland, from being 
largely accepted to becoming opposed, should be understood in light of wider 
geopolitical processes. On the one hand, the collapse of Communism opened the 
way for Poles to participate in the life of the international community more 
fully, while on the other hand bringing concomitant fears and anxieties. The 
weakening of historic Polish-Jewish antagonisms led to a search for the new 
Other. In spite of the long Muslim presence in the country, such a new enemy 
was found in the form of the broadly conceived ﬁgure of a Muslim Other. The 
concept of the ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington 1993) frequently mentioned by 
our interviewees from diverse backgrounds was applied to make sense of the deaths 
of Polish soldiers during the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan – as part of the 
‘War on Terror’– and various terrorist attacks, in addition to being cited in conjunc 
tion with the recent rise of the so called Islamic State. While these are some of the 
factors that have solidiﬁed the belief that many Poles hold of ‘the Muslim threat’, the 
impact of the ‘War on Terror’ on Polish society does not tell the whole story of the 
gradual shift in the Polish imagination from a considerable openness towards its 
Muslim minorities to increasing hostility, and the emergence of Poland as one of 
Europe’s most anti-Muslim countries (Pędziwiatr 2015a). Research from 2011 
revealed that 47% of Poles believed that ‘too many Muslims live in Poland’. Among 
the eight nations involved in the research, Poles were the most critical towards 
 Islam. Nearly 62% of the Polish respondents agreed with the thesis that ‘Islam is 
an intolerant religion’ and only one in ﬁve believed that Muslim culture could 
adapt to life in a European/Polish society (Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011). 
Even if the aforementioned statistics need to be understood in light of different 
contexts of public expressions of prejudice (Piekut, Vieten, and Valentine 2014), the 
ﬁndings of various national studies (see CBOS 2012; 2015a; 2015b) conﬁrm an 
unprece- dented level of anti-Muslim prejudice expressed in Poland. To take one 
example: Arab people, who most often are identiﬁed with Muslims in Poland 
and categorised as a ‘national group’ in the studies carried out by the Centre for 
Public Opinion Research, consistently emerged as the most disliked groups, 
alongside the Roma (CBOS 2012). 
While outside the scope of this paper, it is critical not to ignore that Poles are no 
strangers to the Othering of racialised groups of which the long period of Polish anti-
Semitism that continued well after the Second World War is an obvious case in point 
(Bilewicz and Krzeminski 2010). While we are arguing that Islamophobia, 
particularly expressed through mosque conﬂicts, is a recent and unprecedented 
phenomenon, we also stress that it is critical to understand Polish Islamophobia 
within broader processes of racialisation in the country. As such it requires an 
engagement with Polish anti-Semitism and recognition that there is a continuity of 
hostility expressed towards racialised groups in Poland. In the national collective 
memory, Poles predominantly see themselves as being the heroes who largely 
helped Jews during the Second World War rather than those who also sometimes 
participated in their oppression (CBOS 2015b). Yet hostility towards Jews and 
Jewishness still exists in Poland, even if according to recent statistics Jews are 
much more liked and accepted than two decades ago (they score higher in polls 
conducted in Poland than the most disliked groups, which are Russians, Turks, 
Roma and Arabs) (CBOS 2012). As such, the eruption of Islamophobic 
attitudes in Poland can be understood as part of a continuous trajectory of Othering 
and its alignment with racism (Meer 2013). 
One of the important players in this process of Othering is the Catholic Church. 
After the collapse of Communism, to which it signiﬁcantly contributed, the Church 
emerged as a highly trusted institution and was widely attended. More recently 
however, the popularity and inﬂuence of the Church has been declining (Pędziwiatr 
2015b). 
While in the West the religious dimension of Islamophobia has been frequently 
linked with concerns about the public manifestation of faith by European Muslims 
(Asad 2003), in the context of Poland it has been above all connected with the idea of 
the re-Christianisation of Europe by a Catholic Poland. Poland’s conviction of its key 
role in a new Christianisation project derives from the concept of Poland as the 
bulwark of Christianity [Polonia Antemurale Christianitatis]. This is also based on a 
vision of Europe in which the processes of secularisation has lead less to the social 
space being increasingly liberated from the control of the sacred (Church), than to 
the opening of new spaces for the religious expansion of Islam. As such, anti-Muslim 
sentiments that derive from this particular Catholic position further set aside Polish 
Islamophobia from what has been observed in Western contexts (see Cesari 2005). 
Religious Islamophobic attitudes are nested in various institutional, grassroots 
and media outlets. Right-wing publications playing an important role in the 
Catholic media landscape (e.g. Polonia Christiana and Fronda) actively promote 
 essentialist and nationalist anti-Muslim rhetoric. Tellingly, in an article about the 
opening of the Ochota mosque in the Catholic weekly (Gość Niedzielny 8 June 
2015), the author argues that the spiritual void produced by the processes of 
secularization is being ﬁlled by Islam. Another article on the mosque construction 
project published in the second major Catholic weekly explicitly accuses the group 
behind the mosque project of links with terrorism and jihadism (Niedziela, 21st 
issue, 2010).  In this vision Poland as a country spared from   dynamic 
secularisation processes is destined to defend Christianity and the religious 
foundations of Europe. Othering of Muslims and Islam is used to galvanize the 
faithful around common ‘Christian’ principles and with the goal of stopping the 
supposed ‘conquest of Europe and Poland’ by Islam. 
 
Conclusion 
European scholarship on mosques has typically been concerned with Western 
Europe, where the growing Muslim populations have increasingly wanted to build 
houses of worship – a trend that ‘local’ populations have often objected to. 
Despite the fact that CEE is home to a signiﬁcantly smaller Muslim population than 
Western Europe, mosque constructions in CEE have also recently become 
contentious and are causing fractions both in the wider society as well as within the 
increasingly heterogeneous Muslim communities resident in the region. Yet 
academic inquiry into these spaces is still scarce.  
By focusing here on two recent mosque construction conﬂicts in Warsaw, we 
hope to begin to ﬁll the identiﬁed gap. As demonstrated by the way in which 
opposition to the Polish mosques was mobilised, one may presume that much of 
the discourse that sur- rounds mosques corresponds to narratives from Western 
European countries where mosque conﬂicts have occupied the public sphere longer 
(see McLoughlin 2005). With Poland recently entering into more divisive politics 
around mosques, some might conclude that Polish mosque conﬂicts will follow a 
similar trajectory to those previously observed in Western European countries. 
Such a reading risks reproducing problematic assumptions conceptualising these 
processes in linear ways and ignores the very different realities for Muslims in 
countries such as Poland where Muslims were not primary (ex) colonial subjects 
and had different class positions; from the Tatars who were highly regarded in 
the Polish army to the students from befriended socialist Arab countries during 
Communism. Therefore, we argue that in the study of post-Communist countries it 
is helpful to apply a post-dependence lens that draws from post-colonial theory. 
Post- dependence theory assumes the local speciﬁcity as a starting point and actively 
resists surrendering to a temporal trajectory that constructs Western European 
modernity as a model for its outsiders to follow. With the assistance of post-
dependence theory, the phenomenon of mosque conﬂicts in a post-Communist 
setting can be better understood.  
By taking an historical starting point, we understand the mosque conﬂicts as 
being a new phenomenon that is in contrast to the historically largely unopposed 
Islamic presence in Poland. Islam is not a new phenomenon in Poland, and the 
history of the Polish Muslim community has not followed a similar path to Muslim 
communities in Western European countries. As such, in contrast to Cesari’s (2005) 
argument that Islam goes from invisible to later becoming visible and then 
 unwanted, in the Polish case Islam was indeed both visible and largely welcomed, 
and has only recently become more diverse and increasingly contentious, with 
mosques being ideologically as well as physically opposed. The second notion that 
post-dependence and post-colonial thinking allows us to engage with more 
critically is the ease with which our interviewees applied ‘gender exceptionalism’ 
through identifying themselves with a largely imagined gender equal national 
community – Western Europe – in order to be able to mark Islam and Muslims of 
discrimination of women. Thirdly, as we have shown, in contrast to the West, 
Polish anti-Muslim sentiments have an important religious dimension and are 
used to galvanize the faithful around common ‘Christian’ principles in order to 
prevent ‘Islamisation of Poland and Europe’. Understanding these complexities is 
critical in countering growing Islamophobia and opening up possibilities to 
challenge the worrying historical discontinuity of positive inter-faith relations 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in Poland and the wider   region. 
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